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(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).a b s t r a c tAvailable online 19 October 2015 A small bank advantage indicates that small banks have a comparative advantage in granting re-
lationship lending to small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). This paper used loan data
from Chinese SMEs to test this hypothesis during a ﬁnancial crisis and during non-crisis times.
Compared with large banks, small banks are only superior in offering SMEs relationship lending
through a pre-existing relationship, regardless of the ﬁnancial crisis. Without pre-existing rela-
tionships, small and large banks have no advantage in providing loans to SMEs. We also ﬁnd
that there is no signiﬁcant positive association between bank size and whether an SME changes
its lending bank or the number of its ﬁnancing sources, regardless of whether there is currently a
ﬁnancial crisis. The results indicate that small banks fail to maintain a strong relationship with
SMEs, possibly because of the hold-up problem resulting from relationship lending.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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According to the World Bank Investment Climate Survey of China in 2003, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in China are
facing greater credit constraints and have more limited access to bank loans than do SMEs in other Asian countries. Speciﬁcally,
only 12% of the SMEs in China raised their capital from bank loans, whereas the ﬁgures for their peers in Malaysia and Indonesia
are 21% and 24%, respectively. It is commonly understood that ﬁnancial constraints have hindered the development of SMEs in China.
The good news, however, is that in tandem with changes in the policy and ﬁnancial environments, increasingly more commer-
cial banks are becoming actively interested in exploring new ways to meet the increasing demand for credit and dozens of new
loan products designed for SMEs are being introduced.1 To some extent, the innovations in loan products and the changes in the
concept of commercial banking in China have alleviated the problem of access to loans for SMEs. However, the situation is not
ideal; in fact, thousands of SMEs in China still cannot obtain loans from formal ﬁnancial institutions. How, then, can the ﬁnancing
problem of SMEs in China be resolved?
Research has shown that the development of more small banks could ease the credit constraints of SMEs. Speciﬁcally, previous
studies put forward the “small bank advantage” hypothesis, which contends that in the SME loan market, large banks, and small
banks have their own competitive advantages, whereby small banks have proven to be better lenders for SMEs in terms of rela-
tionship lending. Berger and Udell (1996) early show that large banks tend to provide fewer loans to SMEs. Following this study, a
large number of papers have explored the reasons behind the phenomenon. Among them, the relatively simple organizational
structure of small banks is thought to play a key role (Stein, 2002; Berger & Udell, 2002). Due to the simple organizationalUniversity of Finance and Economics, Wenjiang district, Chengdu, Sichuan Province, PR China, 611130.
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mation more effectively than large banks. In fact, it is the comparative advantages of small banks in producing and delivering soft
information about enterprises that result in their better ability to offer relationship lending to SMEs.
In China, there are studies that support the advantage of small banks in serving SMEs. In theoretical research, Lee (2002)
determined that introducing small and medium-sized ﬁnancial institutions will increase SME credit and increase the welfare of
society as a whole as information superiority among small and medium-sized ﬁnancial institutions is positively related to the
total amount of ﬁnancing that SMEs receive. Zhang (2002) indicated that small banks have advantages in SME lending based
on the relational theory of organization.
Though copious amounts of theoretical research have found the advantage of small banks in SME lending in China, the proof in
the empirical studies is insufﬁcient. Shen, Shen, Xu, and Bai (2009) maintained that local lending authority has a signiﬁcant inﬂu-
ence on SME lending decisions, which further suggests that the “small bank advantage” hypothesis does hold in China. Li and Su
(2011) proved it is easier for SMEs to receive loans from small banks than from large banks and that an SME's relationship with a
bank improves its credit availability. However, the bank relationship effect is more prominent when there are relationships
between SMEs and large banks. This ﬁnding indicates that small banks do not have an advantage in relationship lending with
SMEs as a result of the soft information that these banks have obtained over time through the relationship.
Upon reviewing research in China, it is still unknown whether small banks have a comparative advantage in offering relation-
ship lending to SMEs. It is true that small banks can use their simple structure, ﬂexible loan decision process, and local proximity
when serving SMEs. However, they must ﬁrst expend a large amount of resources to obtain relative information, especially the
soft variety. The cost is perceived as sunk, which cannot be regained if the banks ultimately reject the borrower. Thus, small
bank loan ofﬁcers may be prudent when trying to construct relationships with new borrowers when no relationship exists.
It is also argued that loan ofﬁcers may be more prudent in lending to SMEs during a ﬁnancial crisis because the probability of
bankruptcy is higher among these enterprises, and banks pay more attention to risk management. Kwan (2010) found that, even
if small banks charge more during the ﬁnancial crisis, their lending to SMEs experiences less reduction than large banks. However,
Berger, Cerqueiro, and Penas (2014) used the star-ups' U.S. data to ﬁnd that a greater market share of small banks helps small,
opaque ﬁrms to receive loans in periods of non-crisis. However, this effect declines sharply during ﬁnancial crisis. This ﬁnding in-
dicates that small banks' advantage may be weakened during ﬁnancial crisis.
Based on loan data for listed Chinese SMEs, this paper presents a deeper empirical study on the interrelation between bank
size and SME lending during ﬁnancial crisis and in non-crisis times. We compare our empirical results with those obtained in em-
pirical studies of the U.S. and Japan, speciﬁcally considering the following: ﬁrst, whether SMEs with poorer hard information and
richer soft information tend to apply for lending from small banks, especially when the economy has been badly inﬂuenced by the
ﬁnancial crisis; second, whether small banks have advantages in producing soft information, both for SMEs with relationships and
those without; and third, whether the relationship between small banks and listed SMEs is stronger than that between large
banks and SMEs during both ﬁnancial crisis and non-crisis times.
Based on previous research on small business lending, we use loan data for Chinese SMEs to test the “small bank advantage”
hypothesis during both periods. This is the ﬁrst paper regarding China that has used a two-way choice perspective (analyzing
both the ﬁrms' and banks' choices) to test the relationship between bank size and SME lending. It also examines the “small
bank advantage” hypothesis in the context of a ﬁnancial crisis, since the crisis may result in a change in the lending behavior
of banks, both large banks and small banks. Finally and most importantly, it considers the advantage of small banks in two
cases: a case where there has been a relationship and a case where there has been no such relationship. Most existing literature
examines the relationship lending in case of a pre-existing relationship or mix the two cases together. Even without a pre-existing
relationship, small banks maintain an advantage in relationship lending technology because loan ofﬁcers have greater incentive to
produce soft information about SMEs under a decentralized structure than within a large hierarchy (Stein, 2002). However, this
paper proved that small banks only have an advantage in relationship lending to SMEs when a relationship previously exists in
both non-crisis times and ﬁnancial crisis.
Remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce related theories. Section 3 presents our data
and methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results and their interpretations, and Section 5 concludes our work.
2. Literature review
2.1. Lending technologies and information
Lending technologies can be distinguished from one another based on several dimensions such as the primary source of infor-
mation, screening and underwriting policies and procedures, the structure of the loan contracts and monitoring strategies, and
mechanisms (Berger & Udell, 2006). Furthermore, two classes of lending technologies can be identiﬁed: relationship lending
and transaction-based lending. Under relationship lending, the ﬁnancial institution relies primarily on soft information gathered
through long-term contact with the SME, its owner and the local community to address the opacity problem.
Soft information is qualitative information that the person in charge of bank loans obtains through multi-dimensional contact
with the borrower during the process of providing ﬁnancial services (Boot & Thakor, 2000). As such, soft information is not easy
to transmit within or between organizations (Stein, 2002). In contrast, hard information can be collected, saved, and transmitted
at a lower cost. In general, collectors and users of hard information are different, whereas soft information collection and assess-
ment usually occur through the same person. In relationship lending technology, ﬁnancial institutions rely primarily on soft
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and SMEs. Soft information about ﬁrms and business owners comes mainly from long-term direct contact between SMEs and
bank loan ofﬁcers, such as visits to business communities and business stakeholders (including suppliers, customers, and em-
ployees) and multi-dimensional ﬁnancial relationships with SMEs maintained through bank deposits and loans or consulting
(Petersen & Rajan, 1994; Berger & Udell, 1995; Degryse & Cayseele, 2000).
2.2. The advantages of small banks in SMEs lending
A substantial body of empirical research shows that small banks are more willing to deliver bank loans to SMEs than are large
banks(Berger, Kayshap, & Scalise, 1995; Berger & Udell, 1996; Keeton, 1995). Many of these studies support the “small bank ad-
vantage” hypothesis, though from different perspectives, such as citing organizational and operational differences. Williamson
(1967) proposed the theory of hierarchical control to explain operational differences between small and large banks. He noted
that large banks suffer from an authority problem in the lending process and that to avoid distortions caused by their complex
organizational structure, they need to standardize their lending process. Comparing to large banks, loan ofﬁcers in small banks
have greater incentive to produce and use soft information on account of the simple organizational structure, and so small
banks have advantage in offering relationship lending (Stein, 2002). Berger and Udell (2002) discovered that relationship lending
creates agency problems between companies and bank credit ofﬁcers, between credit ofﬁcers and upper managers, and between
management teams and shareholders. As bank size increases and the organizational structure of the bank becomes more complex,
more serious agency problems arise. DeYoung, Hunter, and Udell (2004) demonstrated that the small bank competitive advan-
tage, with regard to relationship lending technology, is due to the organizational structure and to other factors, such as the infor-
mation traits of relationship lending.
Many empirical researches support the “small bank advantage” hypothesis among different countries. Cole, Goldberg, and
White (2004) used 1993 NSSBF to prove that large banks are more likely to offer loans to companies with regular ﬁnancial re-
cords, greater assets and cash reserves, and operational longevity. Compared with large banks, small banks rely more heavily
on soft information from borrowers based on their pre-existing relationships when deciding whether to approve SME loans.
Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein (2005) reached similar conclusions. In Japan, Uchida, Udell, and Watanabe (2008)
used a unique Japanese data set to determine that larger ﬁrms tend to borrow from larger banks and that smaller banks have
a stronger relationship with SMEs. However, due to their unique data, Uchida et al. suggested that large banks may not have a
comparative advantage in transaction-based lending in Japan. In addition, Kano, Uchida, Udell, and Watanabe (2011) indicated
that in Japan, large ﬁrms with very large banks do not beneﬁt from relationship length. Nevertheless, when SMEs apply for
bank loans from small banks, such as ShinKin Bank, stronger bank–ﬁrm relationships result in a greater likelihood of obtaining
loans with fewer constraints and lower interest rates. Based on the ﬁnancial institutions in Shimane, one of the most underdevel-
oped areas in Japanese, Zhang (2007) found that large banks tend to use less expensive loan technologies, including credit scoring
and other transaction-based lending technologies, whereas small regional banks are committed to producing soft information
about ﬁrms and thus providing substantial loan packages to customers.
In China, Justin Lin and Li (2001), based on long-term interaction theory and joint supervision theory, noted that small banks
have an information advantage in terms of SME lending. Zhang (2002) developed an organizational theory model that reﬂects the
trade-off between information costs and agent costs in loan decision-making, proving the advantages of small banks in providing
relationship loans. With respect to empirical research, a few papers have tested whether the hypothesis of the small bank advan-
tage is relevant for China. Guo and Li (2006) used Chinese ﬁrm data retrieved from the ORIANA database and presented by
BUREAUVANDUK to determine that relationship lending does occur at large-scale enterprises and that it has a signiﬁcant impact
on the amount of the enterprises' loans. However, they also determined that for SMEs, the impact is not signiﬁcant. On this basis,
they concluded that the hypothesis of the small bank advantage in China does not hold. Shen et al. (2009), using the ﬁnancial
data for ﬁnancial institutions in provinces nationwide, tested the inﬂuence of bank size, loan privileges, incentives, banking com-
petition, and institutional environment on banks' SME loans in China. They found that bank size has no signiﬁcant impact on the
banks' SME loans but that the local lending authority is positively associated with it. Their study implies that small banks have
advantage in small business lending because of the decentralization of decision-making authority rather than the sizes. Li and
Su (2011) conﬁrmed that a bank relationship improves the credit availability to SMEs, although the effect is more pronounced
when the SME has a previously existing relationship with a large bank. Hence, the “small bank advantage” hypothesis has not,
thus far, been empirically supported in China.
3. Data and our methodology
3.1. Data
To examine the “small bank advantage” hypothesis in China during the ﬁnancial crisis, we use the 2008 SMEs loan data. To test
this hypothesis in times of non-crisis, we selected SME loan data from 2005 to 2007 and 2010 to 2013, both before and after the
crisis.2 All the data are retrieved from the CSMAR database of bank loans to listed companies, on borrowers, lending banks,2 We didn't use loan data from 2009, because there is no consensus as to whether 2009 was during, or after, the ﬁnancial crisis in China.
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small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) deﬁned by Ministry of Industry and Information in PR China, which deﬁnes SMEs
from the aspects of employee, sales income and assets, and it also considers different industries. Details are shown in Table 1.
In 2008, the majority of SMEs in China suffered from the impact of the ﬁnancial crisis as their ﬁnancial situation deteriorated
and the possibility of going bankrupt increased (see Table 2).
Table 2 shows that the median of changes in the cash-to-assets ratio and the ROA are negative, demonstrating that the ma-
jority of the listed SMEs in China were worse off in 2008 than in 2007. Accordingly, the lending behaviors of large and small
banks may have changed, particularly with respect to their lending to SMEs. Thus, we choose the 2008 SMEs loan data to test
the hypothesis in the crisis period.
We handle our samples as follows:
First, we exclude the data that do not indicate a speciﬁc lending bank. We also exclude other types of debt lending, including
trade ﬁnance, bill acceptance, and off-balance-sheet items. Second, we do not include data on the following types of borrowing
banks: policy banks, foreign banks, trusts, and other non-bank ﬁnancial institutions. Third, we do not include data on syndicated
loans. After this rigorous screening process, 250 valid samples from the ﬁnancial crisis, and 4683 from non-crisis periods,
remained.
Next, we remove the samples that lend from regional banks. The loan samples used in the lending bank study are set to four
state-owned commercial banks and the national joint-stock commercial banks. Thus, the sample size is at 222 in 2008 and 2071
during the non-crisis period.3 We remove the regional banks samples based on the following considerations. First, there are only
28 regional bank samples from 2008 SMEs loan data, making empirical analysis of this period difﬁcult. Second, for us to consider
these regional banks together with the national joint-stock commercial banks would not make sense in terms of either their scale
or the model design. The national joint-stock commercial banks are signiﬁcantly different from regional banks in terms of asset
size, number of employees, number of outlets, regional distribution of institutions, and ﬁnancial regulators. Furthermore, the ad-
dition of regional banks may cause us to create an endogenous model because the state-owned commercial banks and the nation-
al joint-stock commercial banks can operate throughout the entire country, whereas regional bank areas of operation are limited.
Finally, we match the bank loan data for our sample with the available ﬁnancial ﬁgures and other relevant statistics using the
CSMAR data. Other useful data on bank assets and bank market structure are retrieved from the China Financial Statistics Yearbook
(in Chinese) and the China Regional Financial Running Report (in Chinese). Because some data are missing, our sample is reduced to
211 and 1731 for the crisis and non-crisis samples, respectively.3.2. Variables
3.2.1. Transaction-based lending technology proxies
In the analysis that follows, we work with the following basic variables. First, we use four variables that can be thought of as
proxies for transaction-based lending technologies: (1) the cash-to-assets ratio, which is the ratio of the applicant ﬁrm's cash to
its total assets; (2) the debt-to-assets ratio, which is the ratio of the applicant ﬁrm's debt to its assets; (3) ROA, which is the ap-
plicant ﬁrm's return on its assets; and (4) the ﬁxed assets ratio, which is the ratio of the applicant ﬁrm's ﬁxed assets to its total
assets.
As previously noted, there are various transaction-based lending technologies. According to Taketa and Udell (2007), these in-
clude ﬁnancial statement lending, asset-based lending, factoring, leasing, small business credit scoring, equipment lending, real
estate-based lending, and trade credit. Liu (2005), having compared 150 approved and denied SME loan applications, suggested
that business conditions and credit conditions are the most important factors affecting the availability of ﬁnancing. Among
these ﬁrm performance indicators, cash accounts are the most important indicator, followed by ﬁnancing scale, collateral condi-
tions, the status of the primary business, ﬁnancing for project content and strategy. These results indicate that ﬁnancial statement
lending, equipment lending, and real estate-based lending are the major transactional lending technologies available to SMEs in
China. Thus, we use the cash-to-assets ratios, the debt-to-assets ratios, and ROA as our proxy for ﬁnancial statement lending tech-
nology.4 We do not choose to use the variable “records,” which indicate any sources of ﬁnancial information, as a proxy for hard
information, nor do we use the variable “audit,” which takes a value of one when an SME has its ﬁnancial statements audited. Our
sample includes listed SMEs that can provide audited statements prepared by reputable accounting ﬁrms. Hence, if a listed SME
wants to obtain a bank loan using ﬁnancial statement lending, it simply needs to prove that it is in a strong ﬁnancial condition. It3 Chinese commercial banks can be classiﬁed into ﬁve categories: state-owned commercial banks, national joint-stock commercial banks, city commercial banks, ru-
ral commercial banks and foreign banks. In our paper, we deﬁne the large bank as the big four state-owned banks, including the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), the
Bank of China (BOC), the China Construction Bank (CCB) and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). Small banks are deﬁned as national joint-stock com-
mercial banks, including the Bank of Communications, China Everbright Bank, the CITIC Industrial Bank (which in 2005 changed its name to CITIC Bank), Huaxia Bank,
the Industrial Bank, the Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, the Shenzhen Development Bank, the Guangdong Development Bank, Minsheng Bank, China Merchants
Bank, Prudential Bank and ZheshangBank. In fact, based on international standards, city commercial banks and rural commercial banks should be deﬁned as small banks
in China. However, we cannot obtain data on city commercial banks and rural commercial banks. We separate the four state-owned commercial banks apart from the
national joint-stock commercial banks, based on the consideration their great difference in asset size and organizational structure.
4 Considering a signiﬁcant effect on ﬁrm ﬁnancial situation caused by the national ﬁnancial crisis, in our model, the means of the values of cash-to-assets, debt-to-
assets and ROA are adopted for 2007 and 2008. By doing this, we can make these ﬁnancial ratios closer with a ﬁrm's real ﬁnancial statement at the moment the
SME is applying for bank loan.
Table 1
Interim provision on standard of small- and medium- sized enterprises (SMEs).
Industry Number of employees Sales (RMB) Assets
(RMB)
Remark
Manufacture b2000 b300 million b40 million Satisfy any one condition among these three: medium-sized enterprises
must satisfy all three conditions including number of employees N300, sales
N30 million, and assets N40 million; otherwise which is small enterprise.
Construction b3000 b300 million b40 million Satisfy any one condition among these three: medium-sized enterprises
must satisfy all three conditions including, number of employees N600,
sales N30 million, and assets N40 million; otherwise which is small
enterprise.
Wholesale and
retail
b500 (Retail)
b200 (Wholesale)
b150 million
(Retail)
b300 million
(Wholesale)
Satisfy any one condition among two conditions including number of
employees and sales; medium-sized enterprises must satisfy all three
conditions including, number of employees N100, sales N10 (Retail);
medium-sized enterprises must satisfy all three conditions including,
number of employees N100, sales N30 (Wholesale); otherwise which is
small enterprise.
Transportation and
postal services
b3000
(Transportation)
b1000
(Postal services)
b300 million Satisfy any one condition among two conditions including number of
employees and sales; medium-sized enterprises must satisfy all three
conditions including, number of employees N500, sales N30
(Transportation); Medium-sized enterprises must satisfy all three
conditions including number of employees N400, sales N30 (Portal
Services); otherwise which is small enterprise.
Hotel and
restaurant
b800 b150 million Satisfy any one condition among two conditions including number of
employees and sales; medium-sized enterprises must satisfy all three
conditions including, number of employees N400, sales N30.
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individual ﬁgures are not available.3.2.2. Relationship lending technology proxies
We chose three variables as proxies for relationship lending technologies. The social background of the actual controller, de-
ﬁned as the largest controlling shareholder of the SME, is a dummy variable indicating whether the applicant ﬁrm's actual con-
troller is/was a member of the NPC (National People's Congress) or the CPPCC (China People's Political Consultative
Conference) and whether he/she is/was a senior executive in the CIA (China Industry Association). Financial irregularities
(1 = yes) is a 1, 0 variable indicating whether the applicant ﬁrm exhibited ﬁnancial irregularities prior to this loan application
but after 2005. Firm age is the applicant ﬁrm's age. In our regressions, we use the natural logarithm of one plus the ﬁrm's age,
Ln (ﬁrm age), to address the issue of skewness with regard to ﬁrm age.
We chose the social background of the actual controller as one of our proxies for relationship lending technologies for the fol-
lowing reasons. First, when the applicant ﬁrm's actual controller is/was a member of the NPC or CPPCC or when he/she is/was a
senior executive in the CIA, his/her SME will accumulate more information than occurs with other SMEs. Hence, it is easier for
bank loan ofﬁcers to gather soft information on ﬁrms and business owners from communities and business stakeholders
(e.g., suppliers, customers, and employees). Second, when the actual controller is a member of the NPC and CPPC or a senior ex-
ecutive in the CIA, this indicates that the entrepreneurs in this SME have been honored by society and the government and that,
in turn, enhances their reputation with companies and their entrepreneurs (Luo & Zhen, 2008). Because of this important invisible
asset, banks may then rely less on hard information about the SME in question. In contrast, when the ﬁnancial irregularities score
(1 = yes) equals 1, this can be a negative sign with regard to the reputation and integrity of an SME and will make it more dif-
ﬁcult to obtain bank loans. Finally, older companies have more corporate information to offer. Therefore, it is less costly to obtain
information, and there is a greater probability that a bank loan ofﬁcer will be able to gather soft information by visiting business
communities and business stakeholders, as previously mentioned.Table 2
Changes in the listed SMEs' ﬁnancial situation from 2007 to 2008.
Changes in ﬁxed assets ratio Changes in debt-to-assets ratio Changes cash-to-assets ratio Changes in ROA
N 211 211 211 211
Mean 0.020 0.016 0.003 −0.028
Median 0.012 0.022 −0.220 −0.040
Std. deviation 0.079 0.085 1.364 0.052
Minimum −0.29 −0.24 −8.50 −0.38
Maximum 0.31 0.35 8.09 0.10
Note: Changes in ﬁxed assets ratio, changes in debt-to-assets ratio, changes in cash-to-assets ratio, and changes in ROA are the 2007 values minus their corre-
sponding values in 2008. To better reﬂect the effect of the ﬁnancial crisis on most SMEs, we exclude extreme values for ﬁnancial variables.
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We use the following variables to evaluate the ﬁrm–bank relationship: pre-existing relationship (1 = yes),5 number of
sources, and changing banks (1 = yes). The pre-existing relationship (1 = yes) variable is a (0, 1) variable indicating whether
the applicant ﬁrm has a pre-existing relationship at the bank. Number of sources is the number of banks with which a ﬁrm main-
tained. Change bank (1 = yes) is a dummy variable indicating whether a ﬁrm will change loan banks next time.
3.2.4. Bank size
To analyze bank characteristics, we use two variables: bank type and bank size. Bank type is a dummy variable for which a
value of 1 indicates that the bank is large, whereas a value of 0 indicates that it is small. Considering the signiﬁcant difference,
in terms of asset size and organizational structure, between four state-owned banks and other banks, we deﬁne national joint-
stock commercial bank as our small bank sample and four state-owned banks as large banks.6 Bank size is the bank's total assets.
In our regressions, we use the natural logarithm of the bank's total assets, Ln (bank size).
3.2.5. Other variables
Finally, as control variables, we include variables that represent ﬁrm/entrepreneur characteristics, loan characteristics, charac-
teristics of local bank market structure and local economic development within the model.7 Firm/entrepreneur characteristics in-
clude ﬁrm size, executive age, and industry effect. In our regressions, we use the natural logarithm of the ﬁrm's number of
employees to represent its size. Executive age represents Ln (1 + executive age). Loan characteristics include whether the loan
is approved, the loan amount, and whether guarantee. Loan approved is a (0, 1) variable indicating whether the bank approved
the loan application. The loan amount is the natural logarithm of the amount of the requested loan. Whether SME provides a
guarantee is represented by a (0, 1) variable. More generally, bank market structure characteristics include the ratio of bank
branches in the same province as the applicant ﬁrm to those numbers for the entire country, as well as of large bank branches
to small banks in the province where the ﬁrm is located. We use the lag of deposit balances within the city where the ﬁrm is
located to capture its economic development situation.
The variables are shown in Table 3.
3.3. Our methodology
3.3.1. The choice of ﬁrm
First, we test whether SMEs believe that small banks in China have a small bank advantage. The objective is to determine
whether SMEs believe that small banks have a comparative advantage in producing soft information and using it to grant
loans, whereas large banks prefer to use transaction-based technologies and work with hard quantitative information. Thus, we
test the following hypothesis: if an SME has a comparative advantage in terms of transaction-based technologies, it tends to apply
for credit at a large bank; otherwise, it applies for credit at a small bank.
The regression model we estimate is the following:5 If a
6 As p
tional jo
large ba
And dur
lending
thority,
7 We
8 WeBank size ¼ b0 þ b1Pre−existing relationshipþ b2Transaction−based lending technology proxies
þ b3Relationship lending technology proxiesþ Control variablesþ u: ð1ÞThe dependent variable is bank size. Independent variables include pre-existing relationship (yes = 1), proxies for transaction-
based lending technologies (cash-to-assets ratio, debt-to-assets ratio, ROA, and ﬁxed assets ratio), and the relationship lending
technology proxies, which include the social background of the actual controller, ﬁnancial irregularities (yes = 1), and ﬁrm
age. Control variables include ﬁrm/entrepreneur characteristics, loan characteristics, bank market structure, economic develop-
ment situation, ratio of large bank branches to small banks, and whether sub-branches exist (yes = 1). For samples during
non-crisis, we also control for a possible year effect. We estimate the model (1) using both the 2008 crisis and non-crisis time
samples. Considering the same ﬁrm/enterprise may have several loans from the same bank, we use a random effect regression
model to estimate ﬁrm choice.8
3.3.2. The choice of bank
In relationship lending, ﬁnancial institutions rely mainly on soft information production to resolve the issue of information
opacity among SMEs. Soft information comes mainly from long-term direct contact between SMEs and bank loan ofﬁcers, such
as through visits to business communities and business stakeholders (including suppliers, customers, and employees) in case ofSME received previous loan but has not paid it back, the pre-existing relationship variable equals to 0,because in this case, pre-existing relationship breaks down.
reviously mentioned, we deﬁne the four state-owned commercial banks as the ABC, BOC, CCB and ICBC; these are large banks. Furthermore, there were 11 na-
int-stock commercial banks in 2004; together with China Zheshang bank (established in 2006), they are considered small banks. The organizational chain of
nks typically consists of multiple levels, which includes headquarter, ﬁrst-order branch, second-order branch, subbranch and the lowest-level branch in order.
ing the reform of strengthening the self-restraint in the late 1990s, state-owned commercial banks receive the decision-making power back, whichmake their
to SMEs more difﬁcult. Compared with the four state-owned commercial banks, national joint-stock commercial banks is greater in terms of local lending au-
which results in an advantage in relationship lending.
use variables for local bank market structure and local economic development to control local difference.
have done the F test and Hausman test, which show that random effect model should be used.
Table 3
Description of variables.
Variable Description
Loan characteristics
Loan approved =1 if the bank approved the loan application
Loan amount the natural logarithm of the amount of the requested loan
Whether guarantee =1 if the SME provides guarantee.
Bank characteristics
Bank size the natural logarithm of the bank's total assets
Bank type =1 if the four state-owned commercial banks as Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), the Bank of China (BOC),
the China Construction Bank (CCB) and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC).
Transaction-based lending technology proxies
Cash-to-assets ratio the ratio of the applicant ﬁrm's cash to its total assets
Debt-to-assets ratio the ratio of the applicant ﬁrm's debt to its assets
ROA the applicant ﬁrm's return on its assets
Fixed assets ratio the ratio of the applicant ﬁrm's ﬁxed assets to its total assets
Relationship lending technology proxies
The social background
of the actual controller
=1 if the applicant ﬁrm's actual controller is/was a member of the NPC (National People's Congress) or the
CPPCC (China People's Political Consultative Conference) and whether he/she is/was a senior executive in the
CIA (China Industry Association).
Financial irregularities =1 if the applicant ﬁrm exhibited ﬁnancial irregularities prior to this loan application but after 2005
Firm age the natural logarithm of one plus the ﬁrm's age
Bank relationship proxies
Pre-existing relationship =1 if the applicant ﬁrm has obtained loans from the bank prior to this loan application but after 2005
Number of sources the number of banks with which a ﬁrm maintained (i.e. the ﬁrm has received loans)
Change bank =1 if a ﬁrm will change loan banks next time
Firm/entrepreneur characteristics
Firm size the natural logarithm of the number of ﬁrm's employees
Executive age the natural logarithm of one plus the CEO's age of ﬁrms
Firm industry
The characteristics of the bank market structure
Bank market structure the ratio of large bank branches and small bank branches in the same province as the applicant ﬁrm to those
numbers for the entire country
Ratio of large bank branches to small banks the ratio of large bank branches to small banks in the province where the ﬁrm is located
Other variables
Deposit balances the lag of deposit balances within the city where the ﬁrm is located
If sub-branch =1 if a ﬁrm apply loans at a sub-branch
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loans or consulting.
Thus we test the following hypothesis: small banks have a comparative advantage in producing soft information and conducting
relationship lending both in crisis and non-crisis time.
We test this hypothesis using two cases. In the ﬁrst, banks do not have established lending relationships with SMEs.9 In this
case, small banks have larger local lending authority, and loan ofﬁcers have greater incentive to actively produce soft information
about SMEs which is near to the bank. Hence, even when there is no pre-existing relationship, small banks have advantage in
producing soft information and conducting relationship lending to SMEs. We conduct this test based on the consideration that
the more prominent default risk during a crisis results in small banks being more prudent when screening borrowers. This
may lead to the rejection of some SMEs if no soft information has been accumulated. Thus, small banks' advantage in producing
soft information and relationship lending may be affected when there no pre-existing relationship exists, especially during a ﬁ-
nancial crisis.
In the second case, banks and SMEs have a pre-existing lending relationship, and small banks are able to produce more soft
information based on multi-dimensional ﬁnancial interactions. The pre-existing relationship may have more positive effect on
SMEs ﬁnancing when ﬁrms have weaker ﬁnancial condition. The following are our models:
a. No pre-existing lending relationship.
The data used correspond toﬁrms and bankswith no pre-existing lending relationship. Themodel in Stage 1 is the following:9 DueLoan approved ¼ b0 þ b1Bank sizeþ b2Transaction−based lending technology proxies
þ b3Relationship lending technology proxiesþ Controlsþ u ð2Þto a shortage of data indicating ﬁnancial services dates, we were obliged to test lending relationships but not banking relationships.
375X. Zhang et al. / International Review of Economics and Finance 42 (2016) 368–384The dependent variable is loan approved, and the independent variables are bank size, the transaction-based lending technol-
ogy proxies, and the relationship lending technology variables. Control variables include ﬁrm/entrepreneur characteristics, loan
characteristics, bank market structure, and deposit balances within the city. Model in Stage 1 examines whether small banks
have advantage in lending to SMEs, compared with the ﬁnding that small banks have advantage in small business lending in nor-
mal time (Shen et al., 2009; Li & Su, 2011). We use logistic regression for estimation in Stage 1.
To achieve deep insight into the differences between large and small banks with regard to their lending technologies about
SME loans, in Stage 2, we add interactive terms equal to the statistically signiﬁcant proxy variables for lending technologies in
Stage 1 multiplied by bank size. The model in Stage 2 is the following:10 The
model t
the crisi
11 For
that the
using 20
12 Bec
length,Loan approved ¼ b0 þ b1Bank sizeþ b2Transaction−based lending technology proxies
þ b3Relationship lending technology proxiesþ b4Bank size  Transaction−based lending technology proxies
þ b5Bank size  Relationship lending technology proxiesþ Controlsþ u ð3ÞWe use the logit and random effect logit regression models to estimate banks' choices during crisis and non-crisis periods,
respectively.10
b. A pre-existing lending relationship exists (non-parametric test).
Among 211 ﬁnancial crisis samples, only 40 have pre-existing lending relationships. Further, only 13 large banks had loan ap-
plications approved in 2008, whereas small banks had 12. Among non-crisis samples, 22 ﬁrms/entrepreneurs had pre-existing re-
lationships and successfully obtained loans. Because both samples are small, we use both of the T-test and the Mann–Whitney U
non-parametric test, testing for a statistically signiﬁcant difference between the large bank and small bank samples with regard to
the following variables: the ﬁxed assets ratio, the debt-to-assets ratio, the cash-to-assets ratio, ROA, the social background of the
actual controller, ﬁnancial irregularities (1 = yes) and ﬁrm age, number of sources and bank change (1 = yes).11
3.3.3. Strength of bank relationships
We then test the following hypothesis: compared with large banks, small banks have a stronger relationship with SMEs.
To examine the hypothesis, we construct two models.Change bank ¼ b0 þ b1Pre−existing relationshipþ b2Bank sizeþ b3Pre−existing relationship  Bank sizeþ Controlsþ u ð4ÞNumber of sources ¼ b0 þ b1Pre−existing relationshipþ b2Bank sizeþ b3Pre−existing relationship  Bank sizeþ Controlsþ u
ð5ÞThe dependent variable in the ﬁrst model is changing banks (1 = yes), which is the proxy for relationship strength.12 The
independent variables in this model are whether there is a pre-existing relationship, size of the bank, and interactive term. The
control variables include translation-based lending technologies, relationship lending technology variables, ﬁrm/entrepreneur
characteristics, loan characteristics, bank market structure, and deposit balances within the city. To control for the impact of
loan approval on a ﬁrm's next choice of bank, we added the loan approval variable to the model when the dependent variable
was changing banks (1 = yes). We used the logit model to estimate the variable for changing banks (1 = yes) during ﬁnancial
crisis and random effect logit model for samples during non-crisis time.
The dependent variable in the second model is the number of sources. The independent and control variables are the same
as those above, with the exception of loan approval. The ﬁxed effect model is used along with F and Hausman tests. Meanwhile,
because in the relationship test model there may be degrees of endogeneity, which means that some variable that has an impact
on bank size variable has been neglected (Berger et al., 2005), we use a two-stage re-estimating model for the number of sources.
Speciﬁcally, we take the ratio of large bank branches to small banks and whether sub-branches existed (yes = 1) as a tool for the
two-stage estimation.
3.4. Descriptive statistics
Table 4.
Part A provides descriptive statistics for the sample during the ﬁnancial crisis. It indicates that in nearly 30% of the ﬁrms in the
sample, the actual controller is/was a member of the NPC or CPPCC or is/was a senior executive in the CIA. Only 19% of the sample
enterprises had credit relationships since 2005. It was further found that 72% of the sample enterprises would change theircrisis sample estimation shows that the overall effect of model is not signiﬁcant if using a random or ﬁxed effect logit regression model. Hence, we used a logit
o estimate sample ﬁrms' choices during the crisis period. For this reason, we also used a logit regression model to estimate the choice of changing banks during
s period.
ﬁnancial crisis samples, we assessed changes in theﬁxed assets ratio, debt-to-assets ratio, cash-to-assets ratio, and in ROA. This stepwas taken based on the fact
re were adverse changes in ﬁrms' ﬁnancial conditions during the crisis, which may have inﬂuenced the banks' lending decisions. Differences were calculated
08 ﬁgures for these variables, minus corresponding values from 2007.
ause of source limitations, we cannot test the strength of other variables as Uchida et al. (2008) did in their research. In their frame, there are ﬁve dimensions:
scope, distance, contact, and NOBK.
Table 4
Descriptive statistics for the full sample and large-bank and small-bank sub-samples.
Part A: Crisis period
Full sample (N = 211) Large bank (N = 99) Small bank (N = 112) Difference
Variable Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. t-statistic
Fixed assets ratio 0.238 0.140 0.244 0.145 0.233 0.135 0.544
ROA 0.063 0.044 0.061 0.046 0.065 0.043 −0.706
Debt-to-assets ratio 0.499 0.144 0.512 0.144 0.488 0.144 1.197
Cash-to-assets ratio 2.239 4.430 2.472 5.255 2.033 3.558 0.717
Financial irregularities(1 = yes) 0.040 0.191 0.070 0.258 0.010 0.094 2.256⁎⁎
Social background of the actual controller 0.294 0.457 0.293 0.457 0.295 0.458 0.027
Firm age 2.288 0.453 2.251 0.490 2.321 0.418 −1.117
Firm size 21.160 0.716 21.198 0.786 21.125 0.649 0.740
Executives' age 3.800 0.164 3.800 0.019 3.800 0.136 −0.189
Pre-existing relationship(1 = yes) 0.190 0.393 0.212 0.411 0.170 0.377 −0.783
Number of sources 1.132 0.713 1.040 0.750 1.213 0.671 −1.766⁎
Changing banks(1 = yes) 0.720 0.452 0.680 0.470 0.750 0.435 −1.175
Loan approved 0.240 0.429 0.280 0.453 0.210 0.406 1.311
Loan amount 17.315 1.115 17.293 1.236 17.333 1.000 0.259
Bank market structure 0.0376 0.0149 0.038 0.015 0.038 0.015 0.069
Ratio of large bank branches to small 13.142 14.219 14.434 16.406 12 11.919 −1.243
Part B: Normal time
Full sample
(N = 1731)
Large bank (N = 704) Small bank
(N = 1027)
Difference
Variable Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. t-statistic
Fixed assets ratio 0.238 0.175 0.277 0.198 0.212 0.153 −7.624⁎⁎⁎
ROA 0.046 0.060 0.045 0.061 0.046 0.059 0.449
Debt-to-assets ratio 0.412 0.228 0.414 0.199 0.412 0.246 −0.173
Cash-to-assets ratio 3.556 10.690 2.932 5.070 3.984 13.215 2.014⁎⁎
Financial irregularities(1 = yes) 0.072 0.258 0.063 0.242 0.078 0.268 1.22
Social background of the actual controller 0.542 0.498 0.550 0.498 0.537 0.499 −0.501
Firm age 2.584 0.395 2.567 0.383 2.596 0.402 1.545
Firm size 7.016 0.808 7.071 0.819 6.979 0.799 −2.321⁎⁎
Executives' age 3.871 0.144 3.877 0.154 3.867 0.138 −1.409
Pre-existing relationship(1 = yes) 0.028 0.164 0.020 0.140 0.033 0.178 1.350
Number of sources 1.389 0.865 1.350 0.853 1.415 0.873 1.242
Changing banks(1 = yes) 0.433 0.496 0.395 0.489 0.456 0.498 2.022⁎⁎
Loan approved 0.120 0.325 0.179 0.384 0.079 0.270 −6.375⁎⁎⁎
Loan amount 17.768 1.093 17.870 1.177 17.698 1.026 −3.235⁎⁎⁎
Bank market structure 0.046 0.022 0.047 0.021 0.046 0.022 −0.383
Ratio of large bank branches to small 10.896 26.276 12.790 39.651 9.597 9.096 −2.487⁎⁎
Note: Part A presents the descriptive statistics for samples during ﬁnancial crisis, and Part B presents the descriptive statistics for samples in non-crisis period. For
each variable in column 1, columns 2 and 3, columns 4 and 5, and columns 6 and 7, this table presents the mean and standard deviation for the full sample, large-
bank sub-samples and small-bank sub-samples, respectively. In column 8 are the results of the t-tests indicating statistically signiﬁcant differences between the
large-bank and small-bank means.
⁎ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.10 level.
⁎⁎ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.05level.
⁎⁎⁎ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level.
376 X. Zhang et al. / International Review of Economics and Finance 42 (2016) 368–384lending bank the next time they needed to borrow. Only 24% of lending applications were approved. There was also a statistically
signiﬁcant difference between the sub-samples of large and small banks in terms of ﬁnancial irregularities (1 = Yes) at the 5%
level as more SMEs who had experienced ﬁnancial irregularities tended to apply for loans with large banks. As previously
noted, ﬁnancial irregularities may signal SME reputation and integrity, which belongs to soft information. Consistent with other
empirical results, our ﬁndings indicate that large banks are reluctant to engage in relationship lending and do not seriously con-
sider soft information in the loan decision-making process during a ﬁnancial crisis. Our empirical results support this theory.
Part B provides descriptive statistics for the normal time sample. During the non-crisis period, the actual controller is a mem-
ber of the NPC or CPPCC or is a senior executive in the CIA in nearly 54% of ﬁrms. This ratio is also higher than crisis period sam-
ples. Only 2% of SMEs have pre-existing credit relationships. This ﬁnding indicates that SMEs applied for loans at banks without a
pre-existing relationship during non-crisis periods. Only 43% of samples would opt to change lending bank the next time they
needed to borrow, implying SMEs are more likely to change lending banks during crisis periods. A statistically signiﬁcant differ-
ence in ﬁxed assets ratio between large and small banks is found in non-crisis periods in at the 1% level. Speciﬁcally, SMEs with
more ﬁxed assets tend to apply for loans with large banks. However, the signiﬁcant difference in cash-to-assets ratio indicates that
SMEs that apply for loans with small banks have higher cash-to-assets ratios. Hence, determining whether small banks have an
advantage in relationship lending during normal time is difﬁcult.
377X. Zhang et al. / International Review of Economics and Finance 42 (2016) 368–384SMEs maintained lending relationships with more than one bank during both periods. This phenomenon is more likely to
occur when the lenders are small banks. This ﬁgure shows that listed SMEs have attempted to obtain capital or resolve the
hold-up problem by maintaining multiple bank relationships. However, it appears that the more relationships they maintain,
the weaker those relationships become, and the less motivation there is for small banks to procure soft information regarding
the relationships.
4. Results and interpretations
4.1. Firm choice
Table 5 shows results of the random effect regression model in both periods. This table indicates why an SME would choose to
apply for credit at a large versus small bank.
Fixed assets ratio (+), cash-to-assets ratio (+), debt-to-assets ratio (+), were statistically signiﬁcant at the 10%, 5%, and 5%
levels during the ﬁnancial crisis, respectively.
The positive marginal effect of ﬁxed assets ratio suggests that SMEs able to provide collateral tend to apply for loans at large
banks. The cash-to-assets variable, a measure of short-term ﬁrm liquidity, is positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level. This ﬁnding
indicates that in our sample, more liquid ﬁrms chose use ﬁnancial statement lending technology to obtain credit loans at larger
banks. However, the coefﬁcient of the debt-to-assets ratio is positive, which may be contrary to the above ﬁndings. This ﬁnding
indicates that small banks also pay attention to the long-term solvency of SMEs. Essentially, consistent with our hypothesis, dur-
ing the ﬁnancial crisis, if an SME has a comparative advantage in terms of transaction-based technologies, it tends to apply for credit at
a large bank; otherwise, it applies for credit at a small bank.Table 5
Results for the choice of SMEs.
Bank size During the ﬁnancial crisis Before the ﬁnancial crisis After the ﬁnancial crisis
Pre-existing relationship(1 = yes) 0.250 −0.105
(0.401) (0.483)
Fixed assets ratio 1.435⁎ 0.670 0.181
(0.091) (0.644) (0.426)
ROA −1.097 1.918 −0.285
(0.503) (0.678) (0.532)
Debt-to-assets ratio 2.038⁎⁎ 0.152 −0.296⁎
(0.021) (0.794) (0.075)
Cash-to-assets ratio 0.303⁎⁎ 0.493⁎ −0.00191
(0.035) (0.056) (0.395)
Financial irregularities(1 = yes) 0.266 0.491 −0.142
(0.478) (0.730) (0.144)
Firm age 0.0684 1.913 0.110
(0.671) (0.104) (0.160)
Social background of the actual controller 0.137 0.397 −0.0487
(0.416) (0.601) (0.423)
Firm size −0.0719 0.179 0.0280
(0.420) (0.628) (0.494)
Executives' age −0.125 1.737 0.363⁎
(0.785) (0.479) (0.087)
Bank market structure −0.647 −7.261 −0.138
(0.892) (0.649) (0.922)
Loan amount 0.0161 0.166 0.0920⁎⁎⁎
(0.785) (0.356) (0.000)
If guarantee(1 = yes) −0.334 −0.465 0.125⁎⁎
(0.254) (0.409) (0.036)
Deposit balances −0.211⁎⁎⁎ −0.486⁎⁎ −0.0960⁎⁎⁎
(0.005) (0.030) (0.000)
Ratio of large bank branches to small banks −0.00401 −0.00538 0.00138
(0.524) (0.651) (0.114)
If sub-branch 0.678⁎⁎⁎ 1.050⁎⁎⁎ 0.599⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
Constant 12.43⁎⁎⁎ −409.5 −339.4⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.472) (0.000)
Obs. 211 69 1197
R2 0.2023 0.3407 0.1512
Chi-square/Wald chi2 127.45 71.06 249.19
Note: Values in parentheses are p-values. The VIF is smaller than 5, which proves that collinearity is not an issue. Industry effect and year effect are not shown in
the table.
⁎ Signiﬁcant values at 0.1 levels.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant values at 0.05 levels.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant values at 0.01 levels.
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indicating SMEs with good short-term liquidity tend to lend from large banks. Results after the ﬁnancial crisis showed the debt-
to-assets ratio (−) to be statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level, indicating small banks pay less attention than large banks to
long-term solvency of SMEs. These ﬁndings support our hypothesis before and after the ﬁnancial crisis.
It is interesting that relationship lending technology proxies are not statistically signiﬁcant in crisis or non-crisis periods. This
ﬁnding indicates that, SMEs in or samples have not realized the importance of soft information in bank lending decisions. The
marginal effect of sub-branch is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level, indicating that SME borrowers tend to apply for credit
at the sub-branches of large banks. However, according to the theory of organizational structure and lending technology, sub-
branches of a large bank have some disadvantages in relationship lending technology, including the potential agency problem
and limited credit authority. These disadvantages may reduce the willingness of sub-branches to process on small business loans.
It is also noted that the marginal effect of ﬁrm size on the chosen bank size is not signiﬁcant or negative and that these ﬁnd-
ings are not consistent with most of the existing ﬁndings, which maintain that ﬁrm size has a positive and signiﬁcant effect. Pre-
vious research has found that a larger SME has a greater chance of applying for a bank loan at a large bank (Berger et al., 2005;
Uchida et al., 2008). The difference in the results is due to our unique sample, which is information transparent and offers hard
information.
In summary, these results are consistent in both the United States and China. In both countries, an SME with more available
hard information and good ﬁnancial condition can get credit through transaction-based lending technologies, and tend to apply
for loans from large banks. However, results fail to prove that SMEs with more available soft information tend to apply with
small banks.
4.2. Choice of bank
4.2.1. No pre-existing relationship exists
Table 6
The results of Stage 1 regression indicate that the effect of bank size is insigniﬁcant in the choice of bank model during both
time periods. This ﬁnding means that small banks have no advantage in small business lending when there is no pre-existing
lending relationship. During ﬁnancial crisis, the cash-to-assets ratio proves the marginal effect is positive and statistically signiﬁ-
cant at the 5% level. This ﬁnding indicates that both large and small banks concentrate on the SME applicants' ﬁnancial situations
because of the high cost of soft information production, higher default risk, and banks' prudency during a ﬁnancial crisis. The mar-
ginal effect of ﬁrm age is signiﬁcant and negative during a crisis period, indicating that soft information is not the basis for loan
decisions over a long period. In Stage 2, bank size, interactive term of bank size, and ﬁrm age or cash-to-assets ratio are statisti-
cally insigniﬁcant. This suggests that when a ﬁrm and bank have no pre-existing relationship, only transaction-based lending tech-
nologies based on hard information are used to make a lending decision during the ﬁnancial crisis, regardless of bank size.
In normal times, the effect of social background of the actual controller is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level in
Stage1. This ﬁnding indicates that when the actual controller has a good social background, SMEs would be more likely to obtain
loans. In Stage 2, bank size, interactive term of bank size, and social background of the actual controller are statistically insignif-
icant. This ﬁnding suggests that small banks have no advantage in relationship lending when there is no pre-existing relationship
in normal times.
Thus, it can be concluded that the “small bank advantage” hypothesis does not hold when there is no pre-existing relationship,
regardless of a ﬁnancial crisis or not. This may be due to the fact that the cost to produce soft information about a new borrower
is quite high, even if small banks have better organizational structures. Loan ofﬁcers will face sunk costs if the borrower is
rejected. Hence, small bank loan ofﬁcers are prudent when they expanded their business to new customers and lack the motiva-
tion to produce soft information to lend to SMEs with no previous relationship.
4.2.2. Having a pre-existing relationship
Table 7 shows results regarding SMEs obtaining loans from small and large banks in terms of ﬁnancial indicator changes and
relationship lending variables. Part A shows result from crisis samples for small and large banks, demonstrating that changes in
cash-to-assets ratios, the social background of the actual controller and ﬁrm age are statistically signiﬁcant according to Mann–
Whitney U and T tests. The mean of change in cash-to-assets ratios of small banks is −0.498, which indicates that even though
most of SMEs experienced a decrease in the quality of their ﬁnances due to the ﬁnancial crisis, small banks lend to them as they
make lending decisions based on soft information from the past period rather than on hard information in the immediate period.
In contrast, the coefﬁcient of the cash-to-assets ratio for large banks is 0.180, which indicates that even when an SME has a pre-
existing relationship with a large bank, the large bank may be reluctant to lend when the SME is suffering from ﬁnancial condition
deterioration and cannot offer sufﬁcient collateral.
The mean for social background of the actual controller is 0.330 and 0 for small and large banks, respectively. The difference
between the two groups is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The ﬁrm age means for small banks and large banks are 0.50 and 0.310,
respectively. Both of these variables are proxies for relationship technology lending. These results prove that small banks have
a comparative advantage in producing soft information and delivering SME credit through a pre-existing relationship during a ﬁ-
nancial crisis.
Part B presents the result for normal times. The differences between regarding debt-to-assets ratio cash-to-assets ratio, ROA,
and the social background of the actual controller are statistically signiﬁcant. The cash-to-assets ratio and ROA means for small
Table 6
Result for the choice of banks.
Loan approved Crisis period Normal time
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2
Bank size 0.255 −0.953 0.189 −0.294
(0.318) (0.453) (0.544) (0.634)
Fixed assets ratio 3.544 3.506 4.164 4.399⁎
(0.347) (0.331) (0.108) (0.096)
ROA −0.239 0.239 −8.332 −8.710
(0.977) (0.977) (0.190) (0.179)
Debt-to-assets ratio 5.448 4.918 −0.157 −0.330
(0.189) (0.253) (0.919) (0.832)
Cash-to-assets ratio 1.544⁎⁎ 0.860 −0.167 −0.178
(0.019) (0.832) (0.423) (0.395)
Financial irregularities (1 = yes) −0.870 −0.871 −0.744 −0.818
(0.380) (0.378) (0.549) (0.519)
Firm age −1.351⁎⁎⁎ −6.680 −0.376 −0.381
(0.004) (0.174) (0.745) (0.747)
Social background of the actual controller −0.647 −0.580 2.484⁎⁎⁎ −4.370
(0.436) (0.486) (0.006) (0.561)
Firm size 0.184 0.149 −1.209⁎⁎ −1.238⁎⁎
(0.631) (0.706) (0.046) (0.046)
Executives' age 2.738 2.868 −3.735 −3.620
(0.126) (0.107) (0.216) (0.241)
Bank market structure 28.77 30.78 −1.722 −0.507
(0.350) (0.326) (0.934) (0.981)
Loan amount −0.950⁎⁎⁎ −0.958⁎⁎⁎ −0.394 −0.375
(0.001) (0.002) (0.169) (0.199)
If guarantee (1 = yes) −2.692⁎⁎⁎ −2.612⁎⁎⁎ −0.638 −0.653
(0.004) (0.005) (0.422) (0.418)
Deposit balances 0.173 0.173 −0.00400 0.00492
(0.500) (0.508) (0.990) (0.988)
Cash-to-assets ratio by bank size 0.0508
(0.893)
Firm age by bank size 0.521
(0.269)
Social background of the actual controller by bank size 0.644
Constant −3.101 9.463 3.435⁎⁎⁎ 3.562⁎⁎⁎
(0.772) (0.599) (0.000) (0.000)
Obs. 171 171 1231 1231
R2 0.2856 0.2904
Chi-square/Wald chi2 32.85 37.25 27.40 28.00
Note: Values in parentheses are p-value. The VIF is smaller than 5, which proves that collinearity is not an issue. Industry effect and year effect are not shown in
the table.
⁎ Signiﬁcant values at 0.1 levels.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant values at 0.05 levels.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant values at 0.01 levels.
379X. Zhang et al. / International Review of Economics and Finance 42 (2016) 368–384banks are signiﬁcantly smaller, indicating that they have fewer liquidity and proﬁtability requirements when a lending relation-
ship exists. The debt-to-assets ratio mean for small banks is larger, suggesting SMEs with poorer solvency can obtain loans from
small banks though relationship lending. The social background of the actual controller mean is 0.71 and 0.2 among small banks
and large banks, respectively. This ﬁnding implies that SMEs with more soft information tend to receive loans from small banks.
In general, these ﬁndings are consistent with the previous ﬁnding that small banks have advantage in offering relationship
lending through a pre-existing relationship, both in crisis period and in normal time (Cole et al., 2004; Berger et al., 2005). The
hypothesis that small banks have a comparative advantage in producing soft information and conducting relationship lending both
in crisis and non-crisis time is supported in China.
4.3. Strength of bank relationships
In Table 8, the dependent variable is changing banks (1 = yes). Parts A and B present crisis sample and normal time results,
respectively. In part A, the coefﬁcient of the pre-existing relationship is negative and signiﬁcant in Stage 1, both in logit estimation
and its IV estimation. This ﬁnding suggests that an SME is less likely to change lending banks when a relationship has been
established. Results for bank size were insigniﬁcant, indicating that there is no bank-relationship strength difference between
small and large banks in during a ﬁnancial crisis. In part B, the coefﬁcient of the pre-existing relationship is insigniﬁcant. This ﬁnd-
ing suggests that the relationship has no impact on ﬁrms' choice of whether change lending banks during normal times. Bank size
is negative and signiﬁcant in Stage 1, both in logit estimation and its IV estimation. This ﬁnding suggests that large banks have
bank-relationship strength advantage during normal times. We argue that small banks are more prudent to lend to SMEs during
Table 7
Mann–Whitney U test and T-test for banks' choice with relationship.
Part A: Crisis period
Variables Small bank
(N = 12)
Large bank
(N = 13)
Mann–Whitney U test T-test
Mean Mean Z p T p
Changes in ﬁxed assets ratio 0.059 0.032 −1.488 0.137 1.090 0.287
Changes in debt-to-assets ratio 0.039 0.005 −0.590 0.555 1.117 0.2755
Changes in cash-to-assets ratio −0.498 0.180 −3.734⁎⁎⁎ 0.000 −1.850⁎ 0.0772
Changes in ROA −0.003 −0.035 −1.263 0.206 −0.715 0.4817
Social background of the actual controller 0.330 0.000 −2.225⁎⁎ 0.026 2.445⁎⁎ 0.0225
Financial irregularities(1 = yes) 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
Firm age 0.50 0.310 −2.940⁎⁎⁎ 0.003 4.562⁎⁎⁎ 0.0001
Changing banks(1 = yes) 1.202 1.048 −0.961 0.337 0.959 0.3475
Number of sources 0.060 0.032 −0.141 0.888 0.492 0.6272
Part B: Normal time
Variables Small bank
(N = 17)
Large bank
(N = 5)
Mann–Whitney U test T-test
Mean Mean Z p T p
Fixed assets ratio 0.392 0.300 1.730⁎ 0.084 1.305 0.207
Debt-to-assets ratio 0.569 0.427 2.937⁎⁎⁎ 0.003 1.631⁎⁎⁎ 0.008
Cash-to-assets ratio 1.061 2.988 −2.937⁎⁎⁎ 0.003 −4.833⁎⁎⁎ 0.000
ROA 0.018 0.056 −2.535⁎⁎ 0.011 −2.017⁎ 0.057
Social background of the actual controller 0.706 0.200 1.976⁎⁎ 0.048 2.137⁎⁎ 0.045
Financial irregularities(1 = yes) 0.059 0.000 0.542 0.588 0.533 0.600
Firm age 2.860 2.897 −0.735 0.462 −0.308 0.762
Changing banks(1 = yes) 0.313 0.400 −0.354 0.724 −0.346 0.733
Number of sources 1.310 1.156 0.455 0.649 0.335 0.742
Note: Part A presents the results of test for samples during ﬁnancial crisis, and Part B presents the test for samples in non-crisis period.
⁎ Signiﬁcant values at 0.1 levels.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant values at 0.05 levels.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant values at 0.01 levels.
380 X. Zhang et al. / International Review of Economics and Finance 42 (2016) 368–384normal times. Further, it is more difﬁcult for SMEs to obtain loans from the same small bank twice. Hence, ﬁrms are more likely to
change banks when the lending bank is small. However, during a ﬁnancial crisis, all banks prefer a prudent lending policy, and the
possibility of failing to obtain loans reduces SME loyalty. As a result, during the crisis, bank size has no signiﬁcant effect on the
ﬁrms' choices to change banks. Additionally, in part A, the marginal effect of cash-to-assets ratios is signiﬁcant and negative in
both logit and IV estimations. This ﬁnding suggests SMEs with worse ﬁnancial statements tend to apply for loans at different
banks during a ﬁnancial crisis, as gaining loans from the same one is difﬁcult. The proxies for relationship lending technology
and social background of the actual controller are negative in part A. This ﬁnding indicates that SMEs with more available soft
information depend on relationship lending and are less likely to change lending banks.
In Part A, the interactive term of the pre-existing relationship and bank size is not signiﬁcant in the IV estimation. This ﬁnding
indicates that small and large banks are not different with respect to maintaining relationships with SMEs during a ﬁnancial crisis.
In Part B, the interactive term is negative and signiﬁcant, indicating that large banks keep a stronger relationship with SMEs that
have had lending cooperation in normal times. We argue that there may be serious hold-up problems in small banks' relationship
lending to SMEs, causing SMEs to change lending banks. These ﬁndings are inconsistent with the hypothesis that compared with
large banks, small banks have a stronger relationship with SMEs.
In Table 9, the dependent variable is the number of sources. Part A presents the estimation for the crisis period. The coefﬁ-
cients of bank size, the pre-existing relationship, and their interactive term are neither signiﬁcant in Stage 2. This ﬁnding suggests
that bank size and a pre-existing relationship have no impact on relationship strength. These ﬁndings are inconsistent with the
hypothesis that compared with large banks, small banks have a stronger relationship with SMEs. The marginal effect of loan size is
signiﬁcant and positive, suggesting that a ﬁrm will want to maintain more relationships with banks as its credit demand increases.
Part B presents estimations during normal times. The coefﬁcients of bank size and the pre-existing relationship are insigniﬁ-
cant, suggesting that there is no difference between large and small banks with respect to establishing relationships with new
customers. However, the marginal effect of the interactive term of bank size and pre-existing relationship is signiﬁcant and neg-
ative. This ﬁnding indicates that large banks have stronger relationships with SMEs that have previously obtained loans. The ﬁnd-
ings for normal times are in contrast with the hypothesis that compared with large banks, small banks have a stronger relationship
with SMEs. We argue that SMEs tend to lend from more banks to avoid the hold-up problem, especially when the lending bank is
small. The marginal effects of cash-to-assets ratio and ROA are signiﬁcant and negative, suggesting that SMEs with good short-
term liquidity and proﬁtability tend to lend from less banks. The coefﬁcient of social background of the actual controller is neg-
ative. This ﬁnding indicates that SMEs with good reputations and that possess easily producible soft information need not main-
tain relationships with many banks in normal times.
Table 8
Test for the relationship strength (changing banks, 1 = yes).
Part A: Crisis period
Variable Logit IV
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2
Pre-existing relationship(1 = yes) −1.738⁎⁎⁎ 13.81⁎⁎ −1.707⁎⁎⁎ −10.37
(0.004) (0.036) (0.005) (0.512)
Bank size −0.293 0.0569 −0.130 −0.235
(0.125) (0.814) (0.817) (0.696)
Pre-existing relationship by bank size −1.521⁎⁎ 0.831
(0.020) (0.588)
Fixed assets ratio −3.598 −4.900 −3.519 −3.438
(0.217) (0.114) (0.226) (0.243)
ROA 1.575 1.728 1.659 2.203
(0.795) (0.771) (0.786) (0.733)
Debt-to-assets ratio −2.371 −3.112 −2.596 −2.823
(0.344) (0.234) (0.306) (0.252)
Cash-to-assets ratio −1.662⁎⁎ −1.644⁎⁎ −1.716⁎⁎ −1.774⁎⁎⁎
(0.019) (0.024) (0.012) (0.005)
Financial irregularities(1 = yes) −1.249 −1.313 −1.286 −1.249
(0.224) (0.179) (0.221) (0.231)
Firm age −0.384 −0.632 −0.329 −0.345
(0.415) (0.189) (0.477) (0.460)
Social background of the actual controller −1.019⁎⁎ −1.069⁎⁎ −0.997⁎⁎ −0.990⁎⁎
(0.042) (0.028) (0.041) (0.046)
Firm size −0.520 −0.490 −0.539 −0.524
(0.115) (0.143) (0.110) (0.122)
Executives' age 1.454 2.200 1.381 1.226
(0.310) (0.144) (0.326) (0.399)
Bank market structure 21.38 20.89 21.74 22.34
(0.151) (0.150) (0.134) (0.116)
Loan approved −0.637 −0.854⁎ −0.615 −0.612
(0.159) (0.075) (0.182) (0.184)
Loan amount 0.434⁎⁎ 0.419⁎⁎ 0.441⁎⁎ 0.422⁎⁎
(0.026) (0.042) (0.025) (0.036)
If guarantee(1 = yes) −0.721 −0.650 −0.625 −0.507
(0.399) (0.470) (0.461) (0.583)
Deposit balances −0.461⁎ −0.438⁎ −0.422 −0.440
(0.070) (0.092) (0.114) (0.104)
Constant 9.588 3.670 7.521 9.739
(0.189) (0.635) (0.422) (0.319)
Obs. 211 211 211 211
R2 0.2137 0.2383 0.2061 0.2077
Chi-square 36.95 36.64 35.56 44.31
Test for the relationship strength (changing banks, 1 = yes).
Part B: normal time
Variable Random effect logit IV
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2
Pre-existing relationship(1 = yes) 0.238 −6.275 0.153 0.180
(0.644) (0.292) (0.768) (0.729)
Bank size −0.225⁎⁎ −0.241⁎⁎ −0.609⁎⁎ −0.245
(0.016) (0.011) (0.026) (0.469)
Pre-existing relationship by bank size 0.603 −0.0165⁎
(0.272) (0.070)
Fixed assets ratio −0.0322 0.0365 0.162 0.116
(0.971) (0.968) (0.857) (0.898)
ROA −1.333 −1.269 −1.237 −1.352
(0.455) (0.476) (0.484) (0.446)
Debt-to-assets ratio −0.125 −0.0911 −0.278 −0.269
(0.843) (0.886) (0.665) (0.675)
Cash-to-assets ratio −0.0125 −0.0124 −0.0134 −0.0134
(0.188) (0.191) (0.161) (0.162)
Financial irregularities(1 = yes) −0.266 −0.287 −0.322 −0.324
(0.473) (0.439) (0.386) (0.384)
Firm age −0.253 −0.247 −0.178 −0.195
(0.398) (0.409) (0.553) (0.518)
Social background of the actual controller 0.138 0.143 0.119 0.121
(0.542) (0.525) (0.598) (0.593)
(continued on next page)
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Table 8 (continued)
Part B: normal time
Variable Random effect logit IV
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2
Firm size 0.295⁎ 0.287⁎ 0.292⁎ 0.293⁎
(0.067) (0.076) (0.069) (0.068)
Executives' age 0.332 0.302 0.485 0.512
(0.681) (0.708) (0.551) (0.530)
Bank market structure 2.621 2.514 2.959 2.870
(0.608) (0.622) (0.562) (0.574)
Loan approved −0.164 −0.131 −0.158 −0.154
(0.666) (0.732) (0.680) (0.686)
Loan amount −0.0991 −0.104 −0.0614 −0.0607
(0.270) (0.246) (0.511) (0.516)
If guarantee(1 = yes) 0.378⁎ 0.371⁎ 0.461⁎⁎ 0.463⁎⁎
(0.080) (0.085) (0.039) (0.038)
Deposit balances 0.0893 0.0907 0.0716 0.0689
(0.310) (0.301) (0.419) (0.437)
Constant 521.7⁎⁎⁎ 520.5⁎⁎⁎ 397.9⁎ 397.4⁎
(0.010) (0.010) (0.067) (0.068)
Obs. 1069 1069 1069 1069
Wald chi2 37.14 38.30 36.62 39.33
Note: Part A presents the regression result for samples during ﬁnancial crisis, and Part B presents the regression result for samples in non-crisis period. Values in
parentheses are p-value. The VIF is smaller than 5, which proves that there is no collinearity problem associated with the model. Industry effect is not shown in the
table.
⁎ Signiﬁcant values at 0.1 levels.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant values at 0.05 levels.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant values at 0.01 levels.
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ing banks and tends to lend from less banks. However, small banks do not have stronger relationships with SMEs. In contrast,
their relationship with SMEs is weaker due to the hold-up problem. The hypothesis that compared with large banks, small banks
have a stronger relationship with SMEs is not supported in China for either time period.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented empirical evidence to support the following conclusions.
First, hard information plays a key role in the decision of SMEs when they select lending banks, both during a ﬁnancial crisis
and in normal time. This is particularly true for ﬁnancial statement indicators. SMEs with higher short-term liquidity and less le-
verage tend to apply for credit at large banks. However, small banks' relationship lending advantage has not been fully used since
SMEs with much available soft information tend not to apply for loans from small banks.
Second, small banks have an advantage in relationship lending based on pre-existing relationship with SMEs, even during ﬁ-
nancial crisis. However, small banks' advantage only exists when they have a relationship with SMEs. Financial crisis is not the
main inﬂuential factor, since these results still hold true in normal times. We argue that the cost to produce soft information
about a new borrower is quite high, even if small banks have better organizational structures and small bank loan ofﬁcers
faced large risks when they expand to new customers. Therefore, small banks require long-term multi-channel contacts to accu-
mulate soft information and grant relationship lending in normal and crisis periods. However, at present, in China, a large number
of SMEs have not established close, trusting relationships with banks, and as a result, small banks cannot produce soft informa-
tion. Conversely, they cannot obtain capital support through transaction-based lending technologies that require hard information.
This may also explain why the majority of SMEs in China have faced serious ﬁnancial constraints.
Third, there is no evidence that small banks have stronger relationships with SME borrowers during a ﬁnancial crisis, as bank
size does not affect ﬁrms' decisions to change banks or the number of sources. Additionally, it is more likely for SMEs to change
banks next and expand the borrowing sources when the lending bank is small during normal times in order to avoid the hold-up
problem. However, it must be noted that as the number of bank relationships increases, the value of producing soft information
decreases, thus the motive for banks to procure soft information weakens. Therefore, we believe that for SMEs to make optimal
decisions regarding the number of lending banks with which they have relationships, they should consider both the beneﬁts and
costs of relationship lending. We suggest that, without weakening its relationship with its main bank, an SME can maintain a rel-
atively loose relationship with other banks. This provides the main bank with an incentive to use relationship lending technology
to provide SMEs with value-added loan products, thus mitigating the hold-up problem.
Due to data limitations, we were not able to study the lending relationships between banks and information-opaque SMEs fac-
ing more serious ﬁnancial constraints. In the near future, we hope to conduct further studies of the lending relationship between
SMEs at different levels (including information-transplant SMEs and information-opaque SMEs) and small banks (including re-
gional commercial banks and local cooperative banks).
Table 9
Test for the relationship strength (number of sources).
Part A: Crisis period
FE FE/IV
Variables Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2
Pre-existing relationship(1 = yes) −0.217 −2.397 −0.299⁎ −1.597
(0.185) (0.132) (0.074) (0.527)
Bank size 0.0182 0.00189 0.174⁎ 0.166
(0.635) (0.962) (0.059) (0.106)
Pre-existing relationship by bank size 0.209 0.124
(0.135) (0.606)
Fixed assets ratio
ROA
Debt-to-assets ratio
Cash-to-assets ratio
Financial irregularities(1 = yes)
Firm age 0.268 0.300 0.195 0.210
(0.255) (0.151) (0.472) (0.583)
Social background of the actual controller −0.377 −0.336 −0.349 −0.344
(0.165) (0.244) (0.290) (0.584)
Firm size 0.232⁎⁎⁎ 0.217⁎⁎ 0.226⁎⁎ 0.224
(0.008) (0.020) (0.035) (0.141)
Executives' age
Bank market structure
Loan amount 0.0736 0.0853⁎ 0.0735 0.0766⁎⁎
(0.149) (0.091) (0.146) (0.036)
If guarantee(1 = yes) 0.0995 0.113 0.181 0.198
(0.462) (0.375) (0.227) (0.147)
Deposit balances
Constant −3.483⁎⁎ −3.420⁎⁎ −4.850⁎⁎ −4.866⁎⁎
(0.033) (0.032) (0.020) (0.028)
Obs. 211 211 211 211
R2 0.0765 0.0949 0.0940 0.0957
Chi-square 1.45 1.62 1.81 1.63
Part B: Normal time
FE FE/IV
Variables Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2
Pre-existing relationship(1 = yes) −0.0661 −1.858⁎ −0.0830 −0.0673
(0.491) (0.066) (0.389) (0.486)
Bank size −0.0333⁎⁎ −0.0370⁎⁎ −0.0370 0.0274
(0.031) (0.017) (0.427) (0.632)
Pre-existing relationship by bank size 0.166⁎ −0.00290⁎
(0.075) (0.053)
Fixed assets ratio 0.152 0.161 0.155 0.154
(0.643) (0.625) (0.639) (0.640)
ROA −1.209⁎⁎⁎ −1.203⁎⁎⁎ −1.157⁎⁎⁎ −1.206⁎⁎⁎
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Debt-to-assets ratio 0.333 0.317 0.350 0.333
(0.229) (0.252) (0.207) (0.230)
Cash-to-assets ratio −0.00465⁎⁎⁎ −0.00465⁎⁎⁎ −0.00462⁎⁎⁎ −0.00465⁎⁎⁎
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Financial irregularities(1 = yes) 0.162 0.156 0.168 0.162
(0.116) (0.131) (0.105) (0.118)
Firm age 0.788 0.814 0.733 0.783
(0.124) (0.112) (0.153) (0.127)
Social background of the actual controller −0.461⁎⁎⁎ −0.463⁎⁎⁎ −0.459⁎⁎⁎ −0.462⁎⁎⁎
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Firm size 0.138 0.145 0.132 0.138
(0.130) (0.114) (0.149) (0.131)
Executives' age −0.174 −0.177 −0.186 −0.175
(0.507) (0.499) (0.481) (0.506)
Bank market structure −17.40 −18.19 −17.93 −17.35
(0.492) (0.473) (0.481) (0.494)
Loan amount 0.00609 0.00456 0.00663 0.00642
(0.703) (0.775) (0.692) (0.701)
If guarantee(1 = yes) −0.142⁎⁎⁎ −0.144⁎⁎⁎ −0.140⁎⁎⁎ −0.141⁎⁎⁎
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Deposit balances −0.437 −0.412 −0.431 −0.438
(0.127) (0.149) (0.133) (0.126)
(continued on next page)
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Table 9 (continued)
Part B: Normal time
FE FE/IV
Variables Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2
Constant −756.7⁎⁎⁎ −747.3⁎⁎⁎ −768.1⁎⁎⁎ −758.8⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Obs. 1089 1089 1089 1089
R2 0.4442 0.4464 0.4414 0.4440
Chi-square 40.01 37.95 39.56 37.59
Note: Part A presents the regression result for samples during ﬁnancial crisis, and Part B presents the regression result for samples in non-crisis period. In Part A,
the regression results for some variables omitted because of collinearity. Values in parentheses are p-values. The VIF is smaller than 5, which proves that there is
no collinearity problem associated with the model. Industry effect is not shown in the table.
⁎ Signiﬁcant values at 0.1 levels.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant values at 0.05 levels.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant values at 0.01 levels.
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